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Recent contributions to growth theory stress the importance of localized innovation for the
performance of more backward countries. In earlier papers, analyses by means of DEA techniques
confirmed this intuition. In this paper, we extend this type of analysis by relaxing the macroeconomic
viewpoint adopted until now. New databases on output, labour and capital input in the agricultural and
manufacturing sector are developed for 40 countries. Using intertemporal DEA, it is found that
changes in the global production frontier are localised at high levels of capital intensity. This result is
stronger in agriculture than in manufacturing. Further, a decomposition of labour productivity growth
in eight Asian countries for the period 1975-1992 into the effects of capital intensification, learning
and innovation is made. The results suggest that there is a particular development path in which
increases in capital intensity appear to be a prerequisite to benefit from international technology
spillovers.
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analysis; Asia.
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In recent years, a fruitful link has been established between the macroeconomic convergence debate
and the production frontier literature. Empirical work based on the frontier approach, initiated by Färe
. (1994), has yielded important new insights in addition to the more traditional growth accounting
and cross-country regression studies. In first instance, the frontier approach was used to estimate total
factor productivity (TFP) growth without the restrictive assumptions of a particular functional form for
the production function and perfect competition. Additionally, TFP could be decomposed into changes
in efficiency and technical change.1 As such,  the frontier approach can be seen as growth accounting
“with a twist”. More recently, patterns in labor productivity growth have been analyzed by means of
frontier analysis. Using Penn World Tables data in a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Kumar and
Russell (2002) attributed convergence in the world economy to the effects of localized technological
change (shifts in the world production frontier), technological catch-up (movements towards the
frontier) and capital accumulation (movements along the frontier). They found that both growth and
bipolar international divergence are primarily driven by capital deepening, which confirms the basic
finding of Mankiw  .’s (1992) cross-country regressions. In addition, the use of the frontier
approach that allows for non-neutral technological change generated an important new insight. Global
technological change was found to be decidedly non-neutral with no or moderate improvement in
productivity at low capital/labor ratios and rapid growth at high levels of the capital/labor ratio. This
suggests that countries that are far behind in terms of capital intensity will not benefit from global
innovations, which is another possible cause for falling behind.
This finding potentially sheds new light on the growth experience of the East Asian economies. As has
been stressed in growth accounting studies such as Young (1995), growth in Asia was mainly driven
by a rapid increase in inputs through massive investment in human and physical capital, and once-and-
for-all gains from increased labor participation and improved resource allocation between sectors. It is
claimed that technical change played an insignificant role in this process (see also Kim and Lau,
1994). This finding has often been interpreted as a negative indication for further growth (Krugman,
1994). This interpretation is based on the traditional assumption of diminishing returns to capital
accumulation. However, when global technological change mainly takes place at high levels of capital
intensity, diminishing returns are far from inevitable. On the contrary, a period of high investment
might be a pre-condition for being able to benefit from international technology spillovers in the long
run. Only when a country has increased its capital-labor ratios to levels comparable to the countries in
which most innovation takes place, it can start to benefit from global technological change.
In this paper we address two major shortcomings in the convergence frontier analysis literature to
date: the high level of aggregation and the lack of a theoretical framework to interpret the results. So
far, the level of aggregation is highly macroeconomic due to a lack of sectoral databases that cover
both OECD and non-OECD countries. Bernard and Jones (1996) have shown that industry-specific
analyses might be more appropriate for the study of convergence within OECD countries.
                                                     
1 See e.g. Perelman (1995) and Maudos  . (2000) for studies of the performance of OECD countries.
Krüger  . (2000) and Chang and Luh (2000) focused specifically on the decomposition of Asian TFP
growth. Lall  (2002) provide decompositions for Caribbean countries.
3Convergence driven by technology diffusion typically occurs at the level of products or industries,
rather than at the aggregate level. Hence, convergence at the industry level might not be reflected in
macroeconomic statistics when countries differ in their industrial composition or experience different
patterns of structural change. In this paper, global production frontiers are estimated for agriculture
and manufacturing separately using DEA techniques. We use a new database on output, labor and
capital input for 40 developing and developed countries to investigate whether sectoral patterns in the
contribution of technological change, technological catch-up and capital deepening to labor
productivity growth vary. If so, analyses based on aggregate data can be highly misleading. A novelty
in our analysis is the use of an ‘intertemporal’ reference production set in determining the global
frontiers by exploiting the panel nature of the data. For the calculation of the frontier at time , not only
data from period  is used, but also the history of data up to . This ensures that technical regress
cannot occur.
Secondly, we interpret the results in terms of a growth-theoretic framework in which spillovers and
localized technological change play an important role in processes of growth and convergence.
Instrumental in this respect is the appropriate technology theory of economic growth proposed by
Basu and Weil (1998). We will argue that the capital intensification that characterised the growth
patterns of many East Asian economies does not necessarily suffer from diminishing returns, because
heavy investment may offer opportunities to benefit from relatively new technologies developed by
Western countries.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical Basu and Weil (1998) model is
discussed somewhat more deeply. It is shown how the results of standard DEA decomposition
techniques can be interpreted in this framework. Section 3 is devoted to the intertemporal DEA
approach to estimate global production frontiers. Section 4 describes the construction of the data set
used to apply this methodology. In Section 5, we present the estimated global production frontiers for
agriculture and manufacturing. Section 6 deals with the results from the decomposition analysis, with
a particular emphasis on the productivity growth paths of agriculture and manufacturing sectors in








Recently, Basu and Weil (1998) proposed a new theoretical model in which localised technological
change plays an important role in explaining processes of growth, convergence and divergence in the
world economy. They call a specific combination of production factors a “technology”. In the simple
case of two inputs (capital and labor), technologies are considered to be ‘similar’ if they are
characterised by comparable capital to labor ratios. More advanced technologies have higher capital-
labor ratios (capital intensities) and higher maximum labor productivity levels. A crucial element of
this model is the assumption that innovation by leaders does not shift the production possibility
frontier as a whole, but only a part in the neighbourhood of the specific combination of production
factors currently in use by the leaders.
For example, consider different technologies for transportation
services: using a bicycle, using an electric train and using a high-speed magnetic train. Improvements
in the productivity of the bicycle technology have very little effect on the productivity of the train
4technology. But improvements in magnetic high-speed train technology will have some spillovers to
the electric train technology and hence improve its productivity as well. This process of ‘localised
innovation’ was originally introduced by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969). Because of localized
innovation, history becomes important: a follower country can benefit from technology improvements
made by a leader country in the past. If a country, for whatever reason, is not able to invest sufficient
resources to adopt a capital intensity similar to that of the leaders, it will not benefit from changes in
the frontier and fall behind. As a result of combining localized technological progress, appropriate
technology conditions and differences in investment rates, convergence clubs can appear, the labor
productivities of which grow at different rates.
The Basu and Weil model can be used to provide an interpretation of a well-known decomposition
technique of productivity growth. Based on Malmquist distance functions, Färe . (1994) proposed
a decomposition of total factor productivity growth into the effects of changes in technical efficiency
(movements towards the frontier) and technological change (movements of the frontier). To
decompose labor productivity growth rather that total factor productivity growth, the effects of
changes in input combinations (capital-labor ratios) can be added. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 contains two frontiers, (0) and (1), for periods 0 and 1, respectively, as well as two










































( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),&/7   +⋅+⋅+=+ (1)
The first right hand side factor ( )/+ measures the ratio between the vertical distance to the frontier
in period 1 to that in period 0. A value of /  larger than 0 thus indicates that the country under
consideration has increased its level of technical efficiency. This can be interpreted as the result of
“learning by doing” and indicates the extent to which a country has exhausted the potential of a
particular technology. This potential is determined by innovative efforts of other countries which
operated the same technology in the past, as argued in the Basu and Weil model. The second factor
( )&+  is a Fisher index for vertical movements of the ‘target’ (the maximum attainable labor
productivity for the country’s technology) due to a horizontal shift of the country considered. When a
country increases its capital intensity, &  exceeds 0 indicating that a higher labor productivity level
can be reached if it were to operate at the frontier. We call this movement ‘creating potential’, as it
                                                     
2 See Maudos . (2000) for a similar decomposition framework, based on Malmquist distance functions.
5increases the potentially attainable labor productivity level of a country by increasing its inputs. The
last factor ( ),+ is also a Fisher index for vertical movements of the target and measures
technological change. If the first two factors would equal 1, a positive value for ,  would mean that
the country would have gained from innovation by leader countries. Hence labor productivity growth






In order to decompose labor productivity growth along the lines described above, a production frontier
is needed. As discussed above, this frontier is the subset of all feasible techniques that attain the
highest labor productivity levels for the particular technologies they correspond to. We use the Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), because our focus on localized innovation requires as minimal
assumptions on the shape of the frontier as possible.3 DEA involves the use of linear programming
methods to construct a piece-wise linear function over the data  as follows. We assume constant
returns to scale in capital and labor, which, by dividing through labor, allows us to reduce the problem
to a one input (C/L), one output (Y/L) setting. The determination of the enveloping frontiers for one
input (C/L) and one output (Y/L) as depicted in Figure 1 can be stated as a rather simple linear
programming problem (see e.g. Coelli ., 1998).4 Assume the data on the inputs and outputs are
known for each of 	 countries. For the 
th country, they are represented by the scalars L and i
respectively. Let c denote the (	x1)-input vector and y the (	x1)-output vector with observations for
all countries. Then the problem (to be solved for 






















Primes denote transposed vectors, e is an (		
 	 	

   
  	x1)-
vector of constants and L are scalars (1 L<  	
 
 	 	 
yields L=1 together determine the position and shape of the frontier. Thus, L-1 is the proportional
increase in output that could be achieved with the input quantities held constant and 1/ L indicates the
level of technical inefficiency.
In most DEA studies, the frontier at time  is calculated using data from period . However, if panel
data are available, the history of data up to  can also be included using the “intertemporal” reference
                                                     
3 Although DEA was originally developed for firm-level analysis, it has frequently been used at the country
level (see Färe ., 1994, Perelman, 1995, and Kumar and Russell, 2002).
4 For the actual calculation of the frontiers, we made use of the DEAP computer program developed by Tim
Coelli (see Coelli, 1996).
6production set (see Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut, 1995, for a discussion). We have two important
reasons to calculate the frontier at time  in this way. First, because the production frontier is
constructed sequentially, it can never shift inward and hence technical regress cannot occur. The
possibility of ‘technological regress’ seems awkward and hard to defend from a knowledge
perspective on technology, as it would involve ‘forgetting’. Second, as discussed above, a crucial
element in the Basu and Weilmodel of appropriate technology is the possibility for countries to use
knowledge that is generated by technology leaders in the past. Labor productivity levels of past
technology leaders should be attainable for latecomers. Hence, we used all data up to and including
period  in our construction of the frontier at time .5
A possible disadvantage of the intertemporal approach is the dimensionality problem. It has
been pointed out that technical efficiency scores of a single observation estimated using DEA will tend
to decrease as the number of observations included in the DEA application increases. This is because,
as the number of observations increases, the chance of encountering points close to the true production
frontier increases, and therefore the frontier constructed by DEA approaches the true frontier
asymptotically as the number of observations increases.6 However, in this particular application the
dimensionality problem does not arise as the number of countries is constant over time. A related
problem however is that not all input-output combinations realized in the past have been observed as
the data set starts only in 1970. It is possible that frontier techniques observed for the first years of the
analysis are dominated by unobserved combinations in the past. Hence part of what is interpreted as
frontier movements is in fact improvement in technical efficiency relative to these unobserved
combinations. To accommodate this potential problem, we limit the decomposition analysis to the




In our study, we use data on one type of output (GDP) and two types of inputs (labor and capital) for
two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. Annual data has been collected for the period from 1970
to 1992 and covers 40 countries. These include 17 OECD countries, 23 mid-income countries and 10
low-income countries (see appendix 1 for full list of countries). As no coherent and comprehensive
dataset, such as the Penn World Tables for aggregate economies, is available, a collection of sources
has been used. Gross Domestic Product for agriculture and manufacturing in constant 1990 national





		combined with national data collected in the Sectoral database of the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre (GGDC). To make cross-country comparisons possible, average




, were used to convert
the data into 1990 US dollars.7
Agricultural labor data was taken from a variety of sources. The main source for OECD and most
Asian countries was national data collected in the   , complemented with
                                                     
5 Surprisingly, this approach is rarely used in empirical studies, although it has been developed for time series
in linear programming tests of the efficiency hypothesis by Diewert (1980) and in the sequential Full
Disposable Hull approach by Tulkens (1986).
6
 See Zhang and Bartels (1998) for  Monte Carlo and empirical studies of this phenomenon.
7OECD, 

. For other non-OECD countries, data from the FAO database was used.
This data is based on population censuses and interpolated by the FAO on the basis of agricultural
population growth rates. For manufacturing employment, national data collected in the GGDC 

	 8 was used, complemented with OECD,  

 and data from the
ILO,  database. It was ensured that all employment figures refer to all workers engaged, not
only employees.9
Capital stocks have been taken from Larson  . (2000). The main novelty in their dataset is the
careful calculation of the agricultural capital stock. Their main aim was to construct internationally
comparable agricultural capital stocks based on investment data from the national accounts. Although
according to the United Nation’s accounting principles, fixed capital investment should include
livestock and treestock, they found that this is not the case for many countries. Hence alongside fixed
investment, separate series for investment in livestock and treestock were estimated and added to the
fixed capital stock.10 Capital stocks were built using the perpetual inventory method.11 Market
exchange rates were used to convert stocks into comparable US dollar values. A similar approach has








In Table 1, we provide an overview of the countries on the global production frontiers in 1975 and
1992, in both manufacturing and in agriculture. The table gives the capital-labour ratios (K/L) and
labour productivity levels (Y/L) of those countries which constitute the frontier in 1975 or 1992. Both
the country name and the year for which the frontier observation was made are given. As is clear from
the table, the frontiers in 1975 and 1992 do not solely consist of observations made in the same year.
This is due to our use of the intertemporal DEA approach. In fact, for agriculture none of the countries
in 1992 is on the frontier in 1992. And in manufacturing , Denmark 1984, for example, is still on the
frontier in 1992. This means that the labor productivity level generated in Denmark in 1984 has not
been surpassed by any other country operating a capital-labor ratio (or technology in the sense of Basu
and Weil) similar to Denmark in 1984. In 1992, Greece, South Korea and Taiwan operated at
comparable capital intensity levels as Denmark in 1984, but with much lower labor productivity
levels. As a consequence, Denmark 1984 still remains at the frontier for that particular technology.
[Table 1 about here]
                                                                                                                                                                     
7 End-of-year and/or official rates were used if average market rates were not available.
8 See http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/index-dseries.html for downloadable series of the GGDC sectoral and
industry databases, see also Timmer (2000) for series on Asia.
9 This is important, as especially in less developed countries a large part of the manufacturing labour force
consists of own-account and household workers. Excluding these workers would overstate relative labour
productivity levels in these countries.
10 This procedure might lead to overestimation of the capital stock in some countries as livestock and treestock
were included already. But Larson . (2000) judged that this situation was much less frequent.
11 A general formulation of the age-efficiency pattern was used, which comes close to geometric deprecation at
a rate of 0.06 (Larson ., 2000, p. 383).
8In Figure 2, the frontiers for 1992 are shown together with the observations for that year. As implied
by our application of standard DEA techniques the frontiers are convex, as more sophisticated, capital-
intensive technologies can yield higher labor productivity levels. One can see that the use of an
intertemporal reference set rather than a contemporaneous one makes a difference, not only in theory,
but also in practice. Some countries that would be on the contemporaneous frontier, and hence judged
to be efficient, are now considered to be inefficient.
Comparing agriculture with manufacturing shows some interesting differences. First of all, the range
of capital intensities in agriculture is much wider than in manufacturing. In agriculture, a clear gap
between the capital intensities (technologies) used in developed and developing countries can be
identified (see also the appendix table). Secondly, the maximum attainable labor productivity at a
given capital intensity is much higher in manufacturing than in agriculture.
[Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 3, we provide a sketch of the progress that was made at the frontier over the past decades.
Based on the intertemporal frontiers for 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1992, the labor productivity levels
attainable with a particular capital/labor ratio are given, with the level in 1975 indexed at 100. It shows
for example that in agriculture, the maximum attainable labor productivity level for a capital intensity
of 120,000 US$ increased more than 30 percent between 1975 and 1985, and more than 50 percent
between 1975 and 1992. Figure 3 shows that global innovation in both agriculture and manufacturing
is highly localized and skewed towards the higher capital intensities. This stresses the importance of
localized innovation as an additional driver of divergence in the world economy, confirming the
finding at the aggregate level of Kumar and Russell (2001) and Los and Timmer (2001).
Figure 3 also shows that most innovation has taken place between 1980 and 1992, irrespective
of the sector that is considered. This innovation includes the development of new technologies with
high capital-intensities hitherto unexplored, as well as improvements in already existing technologies.
In agriculture, innovation has only taken place in the advanced, capital-intensive, technologies. The
higher the intensity level, the bigger the improvement in labor productivity levels appears to be. In
manufacturing, this pattern is less pronounced, especially in the period until 1985. In the latest period
strong innovation took place at the high-end technologies. In the period 1975-1985 considerable
innovation took place in the mid-range technologies, which covers technologies of about 30,000 US$
per worker and more. Note however, that in 1992, 18 out of the 40 countries still operated
technologies below this level, indicating that they did not benefit from the progress being made at the
frontier.
To summarize, the intertemporal approach to identify frontiers offers empirical support for the Basu
and Weil-view of the world in which technological progress is highly localized, benefiting mainly the
more advanced countries. In the next section, the focus will be on the implications of this
characteristic of the global innovation process for the growth performance in Asia.







Using the estimated frontiers it is possible to calculate the distance to the frontier of each country  in a
particular point of time. In Table 2 these efficiency scores for 8 Asian countries are given, together
with the scores for France, UK and USA for reference. When the level is 1, the country is efficient and
operates on the frontier. The lower the score, the bigger the gap to the frontier. India and Pakistan are
two countries where the efficiency scores are particularly low in both agriculture and manufacturing
(well below 40 % throughout the period 1975-1992). In South Korea and Taiwan, relative efficiency is
relatively high in agriculture, Korea operating near the frontier in 1975 and again in 1985. Efficiency
in manufacturing on the other hand was much lower at 40 and 52 per cent respectively in 1992. For the
other countries the pattern is reversed, as manufacturing activities are much more efficient than
agriculture. This is particularly true for Japan, but also for the Philippines and Sri Lanka.
[ Table 2 about here]
However, having a high efficiency score is not necessarily a positive sign for future labor productivity
growth as it indicates that the potential for future growth on the basis of learning is limited. Learning
as a source of growth ceases once the frontier has been reached. This is especially true when this
particular country is “stuck” at a part of the frontier where no innovation takes place. To avoid this
lock-in in stagnant technologies, increases in capital intensity are needed.  A sector that increases its
capital intensity creates a higher potential to benefit from learning spillovers in the future, as
maximum attainable labor productivity levels increase with increasing capital intensity. Moreover, it
may enter the range of capital intensities in which innovations shift the frontier upwards. This might
ensure that marginal returns to investment do not diminish, but remain constant or even increase. The
specific outcome depends on the size of the productivity enhancing effects of the innovation process in
the leading countries and on the ability of more backward countries to capitalize on the increased
potential for learning. The decomposition of labor productivity growth proposed in equation (1) can
shed some light on this issue.
[Table 3 about here]
The first columns of the panels in Table 3 show the average annual labor productivity growth rates for
the period 1975-1992 for agriculture and manufacturing respectively. This growth rate is decomposed
according to equation (1) into the effects of learning, spillover potential creation and innovation.
Figures are given for 8 Asian countries with France, United Kingdom and USA as points of reference.
In panel A the results for agriculture are given. In India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka average
annual labor productivity growth rates were less than 1 per cent, and mainly due to what can be called
“fishing out”. Starting from a low level of technical efficiency labor productivity in the sector
increased only on the basis of learning. This path was possible as efficiency levels were very low in
1975 (see Table 2). Indonesia managed to follow a “creating with learning” path by simultaneously
raising its capital intensity and learning levels. Consequently it had a higher growth rate of labour
productivity (2.2 % on average). Labor productivity growth rates in Japan and particularly in Korea
10
and Taiwan were much higher. This was overridingly due to a shift towards more sophisticated
technologies, and not due to learning from appropriate technology spillovers. This “creating potential”
path was the only way to maintain potential for learning, as efficiency was already high in 1975 as
indicated in Table 2. Whereas Taiwan combined creating with a minimum amount of learning, Korea
clearly followed a path of creating without learning. In contrast to Korea and Taiwan, which were still
using very labor intensive technologies, Japan also could benefit from innovation at the frontier,
accounting for more than a third of its labor productivity growth. More advanced countries such as the
UK and especially the USA followed an innovation driven path where innovation accounts for 50 % or
more of labor productivity growth .
In manufacturing, the role of “innovation” in Asian growth is more pronounced than in agriculture,
due to global frontier shifts in the mid-range technologies pointed at in the previous section. Results
for manufacturing are given in panel B of Table 3. In addition to this Table, Figure 4 provides a
graphical presentation of the decomposition results through time. The righthand side graphs show for a
limited number of countries changes in the actual labour productivity levels and its sources: learning,
creating and innovation. The left hand side graphs show the development of actual labor productivity
and the movement of the target, that is, the maximum labor productivity level attainable as indicated
by the frontier.
Sri Lanka and the Philippines had low levels of labor productivity growth during the period
1975-1992 and followed a path of “backtracking” by decreasing their capital intensity levels.
Productivity growth in Indian manufacturing was mediocre at 2.7 % annually and a clear case of
“fishing out” as indicated by the large contribution of learning. South Korea and Taiwan had high
growth rates of labor productivity due to “creating potential”. However, as in agriculture, for Korea
creating took place without learning. Technical efficiency levels in Korea declined rapidly, whereas
they remained constant in Taiwan (see also Figure 4). The same is true, at a much lower level, for
Pakistan. In Indonesia manufacturing labour productivity grew very fast at more than 6 % annually
driven by both capital intensification and learning. In contrast to the other Asian countries, Japan
mainly grew on the basis of learning and especially innovation. It was “fishing out” technologies were
innovations took place. France and the US grew mainly on the basis of “innovation”. The potential for
learning was small as labor productivity levels in 1975 were already close to those at the frontier (see
Table 2). UK growth was mainly based on capital intensification, but as it entered the capital intensity
ranges in which most innovations took place, a major contribution of innovation was found as well.
These findings suggest a sequence in which countries first created opportunities for labor productivity
growth by rapidly increasing capital intensities. Next, learning through the effective assimilation of
new, appropriate technologies gained in importance, to be followed by profiting from developments at
the global technology frontier. Japan’s manufacturing sector seems to have had almost completed this
sequence in 1992. The East Asian miracle economies, South Korea and Taiwan, are still halfway this
process. The potential for catch up solely by means of learning was very large and even growing at the
end of the 1980s, as can be inferred from the growing gaps between actual and target labor
productivity levels in Figure 4. Consequently, the potential for further productivity growth is still
substantial, in particular because this potential was created by the strong capital intensification. The





This paper provides an intertemporal DEA analysis of labor productivity growth in the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors of 40 countries in the period from 1975 to 1992, with special attention for the
Asian growth experience. This analysis offered three new insights. First, the capital intensities that
characterize technologies vary across a much wider range in agriculture than in manufacturing. In
addition, for each and every capital intensity, maximum labor productivity levels are (much) higher in
manufacturing than in agriculture. Because the shares of agriculture in aggregate employment are
generally higher in countries with capital-extensive agriculture, this results strengthens the intuition
that productivity growth patterns should be studied at a level as disaggregated as possible.
Second, we found that technological progress is clearly localized in both agriculture and
manufacturing. This may be seen as evidence in favor of theories of economic growth introduced by
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) and Basu and Weil (1998). It should be noted, however, that the localized
nature of innovation is not uniform across sectors. In agriculture, innovation only took place within the
high capital intensity segment of technologies, whereas in manufacturing some countries that operated
low or medium capital intensity technologies appeared to have shifted the frontier outwards, too. As a
results, innovation was not a source of labour productivity growth in agriculture for any Asian
country, except Japan. Only Japan produced with a sufficiently high capital intensity to benefit from
advances in Western countries. In manufacturing, innovation had a bigger impact on labour
productivity growth in Asia than in agriculture.
    Third, the decomposition results of labour productivity growth suggest a sequencing of the
growth process in Asia in which increases in capital intensity appear to be a prerequisite to benefit
from international technology spillovers. The growth pattern in countries like the Philippines, Sri
Lanka and to a lesser extent India, is characterised by a lack of capital intensification. Given the fact
that they operated at low levels of capital intensity where no innovation took place, future growth is
only possible on the basis of learning, that is, improving their technical efficiency. However, this
source of growth is exhausted once the frontier is approached. Indonesia on the other hand started to
increase its capital-labour ratio, allowing it to benefit from innovations at the frontier (in
manufacturing). In South Korea and Taiwan, this process of technological upgrading was pushed
much harder, generating much higher labour productivity growth than in Indonesia. They followed the
lead of Japan where capital intensification drove growth in the 1970s, which enabled Japan to benefit
much more from innovation in the 1980s than the Asian countries.
The results must been seen as a first attempt to shed new light on the role of spillovers in productivity
growth in Asia. The dataset needs improvement in various respects. Most importantly, purchasing
power parities are needed to make output and capital stock values comparable across countries. As is
well known, exchange rates do not adequately reflect relative prices in countries and can be highly
misleading if used to convert national currencies into a common denominator. For the purpose of
comparisons by sector, industry-of-origin PPPs are to be preferred.12 These will be used in a later stage
                                                     
12 See e.g. Timmer (2000) for PPPs for the manufacturing sector in a number of Asian countries.
12
of this research. Next, further research is needed to come up with better capital stock estimates.
Especially in the case of agriculture, land should be considered as an additional input, or as part of the
fixed capital stock.13 Also human capital is an important input which should be taken into account.
On a more analytical level, the results in this paper can be useful in an attempt to reconcile findings at
the sectoral level with results at the aggregate. For example, the link between changes in efficiency
scores within sectors and at the aggregate are still poorly understood. Shifts in the distribution of
capital and labour across the sectors will play an important role in this respect but have not been
studied yet.
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Indonesia 1970 364 406 Indonesia 1970 364 406
Korea 1970 961 2,792 Korea 1970 961 2,792
Korea 1971 1,019 2,940 Korea 1971 1,019 2,940
Japan 1970 9,310 7,784 Japan 1970 9,310 7,784
Finland 1970 22,805 15,567 Finland 1970 22,805 15,567
Sweden 1971 47,999 24,591 Sweden 1985 80,307 37,991
Sweden 1974 72,632 28,771 Sweden 1990 159,187 50,421
5"6
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Indonesia 1971 818 847 Sri Lanka 1978 711 1,317
Sri Lanka 1975 1,133 1,369 Indonesia 1988 1,585 2,605
Philippines 1971 3,021 3,805 Peru 1978 9,985 13,689
UK 1970 17,233 21,445 Peru 1987 14,093 18,987
US 1973 35,571 33,845 Denmark 1984 32,563 42,286
Norway 1973 47,019 36,157 Belgium 1985 40,096 46,898
Norway 1974 53,469 37,307 US 1992 59,257 53,222
Finland 1992 97,263 59,111
Notes: (a) Gross fixed capital stock per worker (in 1990 US$)
















 India 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.37
 Indonesia 0.26 0.24 0.41 0.27 0.53 0.49 0.75 0.76
 Japan 0.70 0.50 0.61 0.42 0.71 0.90 0.91 0.90
 Korea 0.96 0.69 0.97 0.60 0.69 0.44 0.60 0.40
 Pakistan 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.32 0.21 0.34 0.39
 Philippines 0.24 0.29 0.39 0.52 0.84 0.74 0.75 0.82
 Sri Lanka 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.40 1 0.76 0.74 0.86a
 Taiwan, China 0.66 0.75 0.85 0.66 0.52 0.59 0.73 0.54
 France 0.47 0.60 0.80 0.77 0.85 1 0.92 0.94
 UK 0.59 0.71 0.79 0.78 0.85 0.68 0.86 0.85
 USA 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.96 1
Note: (a) figure for 1990




















 India 0.38 3.42 -3.04 0.00
 Indonesia        2.20 0.35 1.85 0.00
 Japan 2.46 -3.03 4.55 0.91
 Korea 5.40 -2.75 8.15 0.00
 Pakistan 1.92 2.50 -0.58 0.00
 Philippines 0.81 4.63 -3.82 0.00
 Sri Lanka 0.89 6.43 -5.54 0.00
 Taiwan 4.51 0.05 4.46 0.00
 France 5.43 2.88 0.87 1.68
 UK 3.51 1.68 0.04 1.76











 India 2.67 2.38 -0.67 0.96
 Indonesia 6.11 2.20 2.69 1.22
 Japan 3.82 1.41 0.46 1.99
 Korea 6.06 -3.21 8.18 1.09
 Pakistan 5.61 1.12 3.42 1.07
 Philippines -0.51 -0.08 -1.29 0.85
 Sri Lanka a 0.95 -0.98 -0.50 2.43
 Taiwan 6.43 0.19 5.21 1.03
 France 3.17 0.54 0.25 2.35
 UK 3.54 0.04 1.88 1.63
 USA       2.88 0.49 0.43 1.93
Note: (a) Sri Lanka covers period 1975-1990.






















1975 1992 1975 1992
K/L Y/L K/L Y/L K/L Y/L K/L Y/L
Australia 141,615 18,989 113,350 25,474 46,863 25,862 46,710 35,817
Austria 63,303 8,261 99,086 15,844 44,749 26,110 81,092 49,068
Belgium 112,634 17,600 138,767 40,050 60,349 26,304 103,119 54,398
Canada 121,180 19,687 109,952 21,922 50,193 29,529 77,440 45,593
Chile 12,660 1,666 13,218 2,833 15,372 4,510 5,006 5,502
Colombia 5,268 1,154 n.a. 1,832 9,576 9,344 7,309 7,270
Costa Rica 16,248 2,426 10,789 3,213 n.a. n.a. 12,070 6,332
Cyprus 7,924 2,829 31,601 9,836 22,408 10,925 23,221 17,248
Czechoslovakia 18,787 2,873 n.a. n.a. 16,677 6,242 n.a. n.a.
Denmark 91,294 12,210 165,330 32,560 43,262 30,423 73,917 44,310
Egypt 1,085 708 n.a. n.a. 8,234 2,248 n.a. n.a.
Finland 52,218 18,819 117,683 36,916 52,415 27,467 97,263 59,111
France 67,110 13,167 112,076 33,141 59,807 31,790 91,217 54,461
Germany n.a. 10,215 n.a. 27,706 42,970 34,848 67,663 48,040
Greece 11,106 5,906 12,839 8,904 n.a. n.a. 29,589 13,328
Honduras 5,450 1,135 2,727 1,945 n.a. 4,370 n.a. 3,927
India 1,264 384 720 410 3,334 1,048 2,954 1,651
Indonesia 719 467 889 679 1,872 1,220 3,048 3,447
Israel 63,961 20,042 96,019 21,563 30,397 24,823 54,088 39,875
Italy 37,053 9,785 130,126 22,211 32,557 22,065 70,543 45,360
Jamaica 3,145 976 1,883 1,135 19,115 12,101 n.a. n.a.
Japan 22,679 10,797 88,530 16,398 44,371 25,182 62,971 48,235
Korea 1,735 3,229 19,057 8,090 7,202 6,166 34,864 17,283
Netherlands 92,583 19,083 146,787 37,779 56,623 27,025 84,001 46,866
New Zealand 129,784 13,747 80,975 15,431 33,720 23,392 50,192 35,857
Norway 83,040 15,708 146,284 22,784 62,567 37,282 96,726 50,330
Pakistan 1,611 358 1,087 496 2,203 884 4,087 2,295
Peru 3,470 1,011 2,476 927 15,763 15,175 21,413 18,008
Philippines 1,312 740 669 849 4,439 4,647 3,528 4,261
Poland 9,931 773 n.a. n.a. 15,590 6,451 n.a. n.a.
South Africa 10,604 1,457 11,773 2,020 25,665 13,460 36,642 15,273
Sri Lanka 1,796 456 594 530 1,133 1,369 1,059a 1,579 a
Sweden 84,462 27,090 162,657 48,788 59,562 35,443 93,728 52,619
Taiwan, China 3,568 2,905 12,256 6,257 12,310 7,994 35,892 23,857
Tanzania 1,002 134 585 182 n.a. 2,442 n.a. 637
Tunisia 6,352 1,630 8,815 2,803 7,310 3,464 10,987 5,606
Turkey 3,502 1,819 2,657 1,955 23,167 12,699 11,291 10,908
UK 83,461 16,910 87,844 30,714 27,421 24,039 54,132 43,894
Uruguay 31,696 4,101 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
USA 121,507 20,718 102,752 36,408 43,788 32,619 59,257 53,222
Venezuela 22,165 2,327 n.a. 3,137 33,271 11,999 16,216 10,024
Note (a): figures for 1990
